CACI intentional infliction of emotional distress
Plaintiff corporation appealed a decision from the Superior Court of Marin County (California), which held that it could not personally enforce its judgment against defendant partner.
Defendant partner entered into a partnership agreement with other partners. Plaintiff corporation initiated an action against the partnership, defendant, and the individual partners. Defendant was never served with process, but an attorney purportedly filed an answer on behalf of the parties. Plaintiff was awarded judgment and attempted to personally enforce such judgment against defendant. The trial court concluded that defendant did not authorize the attorney's general appearance on his behalf, so plaintiff could not personally enforce its judgment against defendant. On appeal, the CACI intentional infliction of emotional distress affirmed the decision. The judgment could be enforced against defendant's partnership assets, but could not be enforced individually against him. Defendant was never served process, had no knowledge of plaintiff's action against him, and did not authorize the attorney's appearance on his behalf. The other partners had the authority to hire an attorney to represent the partnership, but not to represent defendant in his individual capacity.
The court affirmed the decision because defendant partner was not served with process and did not authorize the partnership's attorney to file an answer on his behalf. Plaintiff corporation could enforce its judgment against defendant's assets from the partnership, but not against defendant's personal assets.
Plaintiff patient appealed the order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (California), which granted defendant doctors' motion for summary judgment in plaintiff's medical malpractice action. Plaintiff claimed that the trial court erred in holding that the statute of limitations in her medical malpractice action was not tolled under Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5.
Plaintiff patient was under the care of defendant doctors when she gave birth to a stillborn baby following a Caesarian section. She filed suit for medical malpractice over one year from the date of surgery. The trial court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff's action was timed barred by the statute of limitations in Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 340.5. Plaintiff appealed, claiming that on a motion for summary judgment, defendants bore the burden of demonstrating that no triable issue existed and that defendants had knowingly or negligently failed to disclose facts on which the complaint was based. The court affirmed and held the tolling provision in the pre-1975 version of § 340.5 applied only to the four-year, and not to the one-year, limitations period. It concluded that the trial court properly found that plaintiff's action was barred by the lapse of more than one year between the date when plaintiff either discovered, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, her injury and the date she filed the complaint. Any nondisclosure by defendants, for purpose of tolling, did not affect the one-year limitations period.
The court affirmed the grant of summary judgment to defendant doctors in plaintiff patient's medical malpractice action, holding that the trial court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment was proper. Plaintiff's action for medical malpractice was time barred by the applicable statute of limitations, and the tolling period applied only to the four-year limitations period and not to the one-year period that barred plaintiff's action.